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Process-Based Constitutional Theories
Laurence H. Tribet
In deciding constitutional cases, the Supreme Court has often in-
voked a vision of how politics should work, justifying judicial interven-
tion as a response to supposed gaps between that vision and political
reality. Legislation or other governmental action is of constitutional
concern, the Court suggests, when it seems to obstruct political repre-
sentation and accountability-by blocking speech or voting, for ex-
ample-or when it reveals the existence of past or present obstructions-
by distributing the law's benefits and burdens in ways that show a
particular group to have been denied fair representation.1 By invali-
dating legislative or administrative acts of this sort, the Court can
reason, it avoids controversial judgments about substantive issues left
open by the Constitution's text and history, and safeguards the repre-
sentative character of the political process.
It is easy to see why courts would be attracted to this way of describ-
ing the content and role of constitutional law. Such an account permits
courts to perceive and portray themselves as servants of democracy even
as they strike down the actions of supposedly democratic governments.
2
t Professor of Law, Harvard University. A.B., Harvard, 1962; J.D. 1966. I would like
to acknowledge the extensive help of Professor Patrick 0. Gudridge of the University of
Miami Law School. Professor Gudridge and I are collaborating on what we hope will be
a series of essays on the foundations of constitutional law. This Article is the introduction
to that joint enterprise.
1. The best known statement of this view by the Supreme Court was written by Justice
Stone in United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938):
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts those political
processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable
legislation, is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general
prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types of legisla-
tion ....
Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the review of statutes
directed at particular religious, . . . or national . . . or racial minorities .. ;
whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition,
which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily
to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly
more searching judicial inquiry.
2. The doctrinal forms in which the Supreme Court expresses its decisions at least
sometimes support the view that the Court is attempting to portray itself as working
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But other constitutional theorists, unencumbered by the judiciary's
rhetorical needs, also find the idea of perfecting process, and process
alone, to be powerfully magnetic. 3 In the most recent and lucid argu-
ment for a process-perfecting view of constitutional law, John Ely's
Democracy and Distrust, the vision is boldly stated:
[C]ontrary to the standard characterization of the Constitution
as "an eduring but evolving statement of general values," . . . in
fact the selection and accommodation of substantive values is left
almost entirely to the political process and instead the document
is overwhelmingly concerned, on the one hand, with procedural
fairness in the resolution of individual disputes (process writ
small), and on the other, with what might capaciously be des-
ignated process writ large-with ensuring broad participation in
the processes and distributions of government.
4
Yet it is not difficult to show that the constitutional theme of per-
fecting the processes of governmental decision is radically indeterminate
and fundamentally incomplete. The process theme by itself determines
almost nothing unless its presuppositions are specified, and its content
supplemented, by a full theory of substantive rights and values-the
very sort of theory the process-perfecters are at such pains to avoid. If
that proposition, which this Article seeks to elaborate, is correct, it
leaves us with a puzzle: why do thoughtful judges and scholars con-
with, or at least not against, Congress or state legislatures. Judicial review should continue
to leave room for legislative action or so, at least, Justice Jackson suggested in defending
equal protection analysis. See Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 111-12
(1949) (Jackson, J., concurring) (preferring use of equal protection clause to use of due
process clause to invalidate legislation, as former leaves government option of drafting
more equitably framed legislation to regulate conduct). Some commentators have thought
that a similar idea partly explained the appeal (for a time) of the First Amendment over-
breadth doctrine. See, e.g., G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1134 (1975).
3. See, e.g., L. LUSKY, BY WHAT RIGHT? (1975); Ball, Judicial Protection of Powerless
Minorities, 59 IoWA L. REv. 1059 (1974); Black, The Unfinished Business of the Warren
Court, 46 WASH. L. REv. 3, 8-9 (1970); Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term-Foreword:
In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARv. L. REv. 1, 6-12 (1976); Fiss,
Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, in EQUALITY AND PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT 85,
130 (M. Cohen, T. Nagel & T. Scanlon eds. 1977); Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976
Term-Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARv. L. REV.
1, 8-10, 24-26 (1977); Tribe, Structural Due Process, 10 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 269
(1975); Note, Mental Illness: A Suspect Classification?, 83 YALE L.J. 1237 (1974). See gen-
erally Rostow, The Democratic Character of Judicial Review, 66 HARv. L. REV. 193
(1952). Sometimes the concern for process is coupled with an effort to ground constitu-
tional law in fundamental values, such as respect for individual dignity. See, e.g., Brest,
supra, at 11 (prevention of stigmatic harms to particular individuals supports anti-
discrimination principle in equal protection doctrine); Karst, supra, at 8 (participation in
community decisionmaking processes contributes to self-respect).
4. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DismusT 87 (1980) (footnotes omitted) [hereinafter cited
as ELY].
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Process-Based Theories
tinue to put forth process-perfecting theories as though such theories
could banish divisive controversies over substantive values from the
realm of constitutional discourse by relegating those controversies to
the unruly world of power?
I. The Constitution's Openly Substantive Commitments
One difficulty that immediately confronts process theories is the
stubbornly substantive character of so many of the Constitution's most
crucial commitments: commitments defining the values that we as a
society, acting politically, must respect. Plainly, the First Amend-
ment's guarantee of religious liberty and its prohibition of religious
establishment are substantive in this sense.a So, too, is the Thirteenth
Amendment, in its abolition of slavery and repudiation of the Consti-
tution's earlier, ostensibly procedural, protections of that institution.
In many of its parts, the Constitution also evinces a substantive
commitment to the institution of private property and to the con-
tractual expectations that surround it. The just compensation clause
of the Fifth Amendment is an obvious example.7 The contracts clause
of article I, section 10 is another.8 The old substantive due process,
which is obviously an important part of our constitutional history and
thus significant for our understanding of what the Constitution is
5. See B. BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 246-72
(1967).
6. See Note, The Thirteenth Amendment and Private Affirmative Action, 89 YALE L.J.
399, 406 (1979) (framers of amendment intended to guarantee blacks "meaningful freedom"
by obliterating all vestiges of slavery). To say that the nation's experience with slavery
shows the folly of incorporating substantive matters in the Constitution, see ELY, supra
note 4, at 93, 100, 226 n.68, is simply to invert the lessons of our history.
7. Just compensation cases, arising under the Constitution or under statutes that
Congress and the state legislatures have adopted in response to constitutional require-
ments, are a steady and continuing part of the business of the courts. See generally B.
ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION (1977).
8. Contracts clause cases, rarer than just compensation cases, are thought to be less
important because the clause itself imposes no significant restriction. The conventional
view is that the Supreme Court, in limiting the clause's protection to that against retroac-
tive legislation, see Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 303 (1827), rendered the
clause less significant. The traditional learning holds that whatever residual importance
the clause retained has disappeared. See Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398
(1934) (reasonable legislation, even if retroactive, disturbs no legitimate expectation in-
terest of contracting parties). The Court, however, has on some 100 occasions since
Ogden voided state statutes and municipal ordinances under the clause. Moreover, the
Court that decided Blaisdell did not act as if that decision vitiated the clause. See, e.g.,
Wood v. Lovett, 313 U.S. 362 (1941) (state law that removed procedural rights from
purchasers at a tax sale violates clause); Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95
(1938) (state teacher tenure law held to have created a binding obligation under clause).
Indeed, the Court has very recently invalidated state legislation under the contracts
clause. See, e.g., Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978); United States
Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977).
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about, also served to protect the transactions and expectations to which
the institution of private property gives rise.9 Whatever our views of
the substantive due process heyday, most of us would readily concede
that the framers of the 1787 Constitution adopted a federal system of
government organization in order to, among other goals, help secure
the institution of private property.' 0 When Madison, in his theory of
faction, suggested that shifting the legislative responsibility for certain
problems from the state to the national level could help assure that
majorities would not trample minority rights," the problems he had
9. See, e.g., Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915) (protecting employer's constitutional
right under due process clause to choose not to hire union member employees); Lochner
v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (invalidating maximum hour work laws as violative of
contractual liberties protected by Constitution).
A number of critics have charged that the old substantive due process is inconsistent
with the language of the due process clause itself. See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274
U.S. 357, 373 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring); ELY, supra note 4, at 18 ("ETihere is
simply no avoiding the fact that the word that follows 'due' is 'process.' "). But the words
that follow "due process" are "of law," and the word "law" seems to have been the
textual point of departure for substantive due process. See, e.g., Hurtado v. California,
110 U.S. 516, 535-36 (1884):
It is not every act, legislative in form, that is law. Law is something more than mere
will exerted as an act of power. It must not be a special rule for a particular person
or a particular case, ... thus excluding, as not due process of law, acts of attainder,
bills of pains and penalties, acts of confiscation, acts reversing judgments, and acts
directly transferring one man's estate to another, legislative judgments and decrees,
and other similar special, partial and arbitrary exertions of power under the forms of
legislation.
The form that substantive due process analysis took has recently begun to receive
scholarly attention. See Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFFALO
L. REV. 205 (1979); Miller, The Forest of Due Process of Law: The American Constitutional
Tradition, in DUE PROCESS: NoMos XVIII 3 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1977). "Due
process of law" was elaborated through a theory of legislation founded upon ideals of
separation of powers. The theory distinguished legislation from adjudication by assigning
to adjudication the task of rearranging vested rights; it distinguished among types of
legislation by asking whether the various types infringed vested rights; and it identified
vested rights by treating the common law as a mirror of individual expectations, by re-
garding that which the common law protected-liberty of contract, for example-as some-
thing that individuals rightly presupposed, and upon which individuals justifiably relied.
See T. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 500-75 (7th ed. 1903).
The form of the old substantive due process doctrine is important here for two reasons.
That the doctrine had form-and a form that drew upon such traditional sources of legal
principles as ideas about the common law and separation of powers-suggests that the
substantive due process cases were not some mad judicial tear, which we may today
safely and gladly forget. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 434-36 (1978).
Moreover, the fact that the form of the doctrine drew in part upon separation of powers
concepts illustrates a more general point: the Constitution may appear in large part to
address the structure and arrangement of government-process writ large and small-but
the concerns that underlie and explain the structures and arrangements ordained by the
Constitution are themselves undeniably substantive.
10. See Wood, Rhetoric and Reality in the American Revolution, 23 WM. & MARY
Q. 3 (3d Ser. 1966).
11. See, e.g., THE FEuERALr No. 10 (J. Madison).
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in mind were largely economic;12 the minority rights the federal system
would protect were, for the most part, rights of property and contract.1
3
Religious freedom, antislavery, private property: much of our con-
stitutional history can be written by reference to just these social
institutions and substantive values. That the Constitution has long
addressed such matters, and often with beneficial effect, ought to sur-
prise no one. What is puzzling is that anyone can say, in the face of this
reality, that the Constitution is or should be predominantly concerned
with process and not substance.
But our constitutional reality poses even deeper problems for process
theorists. Even the Constitution's most procedural prescriptions cannot
be adequately understood, much less applied, in the absence of a de-
veloped theory of fundamental rights that are secured to persons against
the state-a theory whose derivation demands precisely the kinds of
controversial substantive choices that the process proponents are so
anxious to leave to the electorate and its representatives.
II. The Substantive Roots of Procedural Norms
Much of the Constitution does indeed appear to address matters of
procedure. Sometimes the subject is adjudicative process-the process
due to individuals who become defendants in criminal or civil litiga-
tion or targets of administrative actions. Elsewhere, the Constitu-
12. For example, witness which responsibilities the framers gave to the federal govern-
ment-particularly the power to regulate interstate and foreign commerce. U.S. CONST.,
art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Many of the prohibitions of article I, § 10, also have an economic cast:
No State shall . . . coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but gold and
silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any ... Law impairing the Obliga-
tion of Contracts ....
No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on
Imports or Exports ....
No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Duty of Tonnage ....
13. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 79 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) ("But the most common
and durable source of factions has been the various and unequal distribution of property.
Those who hold, and those who are without property, have ever formed distinct interests
in society. Those who are creditors, and those who are debtors, fall under a like dis-
crimination."); G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 503-04 (1969) (federal
bicameralism as means of protecting minority property rights).
It is a mistake to view the concern of the Federalists with property rights in con-
temporary terms. Property rights in the late 18th century partook more of status than of
exchange; debtor legislation was perceived as threatening not only because it represented
the loss of wealth but also because it portended the triumph of the "licentious," the
disruption of an order of virtue and merit in society. See id. at 393-425. Yet, even if the
concern with property is recast in 18th-century terms, the protection of individual property
rights remains intact as an aim of the Constitution. See id. at 609 ("The liberty that was
now emphasized was personal or private, the protection of individual rights against all
governmental encroachments, particularly by the legislature . . . . Government was no
longer designed merely to promote the collective happiness of the people, but also . .
'to protect citizens in their personal liberty and their property'.....)
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tion focuses on representative process-including the process that
governs the election of Congress,' 4 of the President, 15 or of state repre-
sentative bodies. 16 That the subject in all these cases is procedure,
however, is not to say that the meaning and purpose of the Constitu-
tion's prescriptions on each such subject are themselves merely pro-
cedural. There is no reason to suppose that "constitutive" rules-rules
defining the basic structure of political and legal relations-can or
should be essentially neutral on matters of substantive value.
The very dichotomy just drawn-between adjudicative and repre-
sentative process-would prove incoherent without a substantive theory.
How do we decide which form of participation the complaining in-
dividual may claim: the right to be heard as a litigant, or the right
to be counted as a voter? The question whether individuals may insist
on being heard by rulemakers, for whom they have already (directly or
indirectly) voted, has bedeviled administrative law since the turn of the
century. 7 How the government chooses to deal with individuals-as
individuals or en masse-cannot be dispositive. For, at least sometimes,
government action that purports to deal with groups is unconstitu-
tional precisely because it does not deal with individuals as such: the
conclusive presumption decisions' s and the mandatory death penalty
cases,' 9 however opaque they might otherwise be, establish this much,
as does Justice Powell's opinion in Regents of the University of Cali-
fornia v. Bakke.20 Conversely, in at least some circumstances, there is
14. See, e.g., U.S. CONST., art. I, §§ 2, 3.
15. See, e.g., id., art. II, § 1.
16. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964) (equal protection clause requires
apportionment of state legislative seats by population).
17. See, e.g., Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915) (no
hearing necessary before assessments of all taxable property uniformly increased); Lon-
doner v. City of Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908) (hearing required before costs of local im-
provements are assessed to property owners on the basis of relative benefit).
18. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 645 (1974) (mandatory
maternity-leave rules creating an irrebuttable presumption violate due process clause in
failing to recognize individual differences); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656-57 (1972)
(statute containing irrebuttable presumption that all unmarried fathers are incompetent
to raise children is unconstitutionally overbroad). For a discussion of these and related
cases, see L. TRiNE, supra note 9, at 1092-97.
19. See, e.g., Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978) (Eighth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments require death penalty statutes to permit individualized consideration of mitigating
factors for each defendant); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (opinion
of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.) (process must treat offenders on individualized basis
in capital cases); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 197-98 (1976) (death penalty held
constitutional when statute is drafted to ensure jury consideration of individual cir-
cumstances of crime and offender).
20. 438 U.S. 265, 320 (1978) (Powell, J., announcing judgment of the Court) (relying
on "personal rights" theory of equal protection clause to invalidate racial quotas in
medical school admissions); see Tribe, Perspectives on Bakke: Equal Protection, Procedural
Fairness, or Structural Justice?, 92 H.av. L. REv. 864, 867 (1979).
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no constitutional infirmity in relying only on representative, or even
directly democratic, processes to deal with individuated grievances: in-
dividual zoning variances may be made the subject of local refer-
endum;2 and unions, as delegatees of federal power, 22 may bind mem-
bers of bargaining units to the terms of wage bargains or, indeed, of in-
dividual gTievance negotiations, even though the unions do not act as
representatives of individuals as individuals.23
The question of whether adjudicative or representative process is
required in a given context simply cannot be analyzed in terms of how
fairly and accurately various participatory processes reflect the interests
and inputs of those governed by them. Deciding what kind of participa-
tion the Constitution demands requires analysis not only of the efficacy
of alternative processes but also of the character and importance of the
interest at stake-its role in the life of the individual as an individual.
That analysis, in turn, requires a theory of values and rights as plainly
substantive as, and seemingly of a piece with, the theories of values
and rights that underlie the Constitution's provisions addressing reli-
gion, slavery, and property.
Once one has decided whether the Constitution requires adjudicative
or representative process in a particular setting, one must again rely on
substantive values in elaborating the requirements of either procedural
form. Consider first the problem of adjudicative process. Certainly the
Fifth Amendment's self-incrimination and double jeopardy clauses
embody concerns for protecting individual dignity in the criminal
process.24 A substantive concern for individual "privacy" necessarily
underpins the Fourth Amendment. 25 Other superficially procedural
21. See, e.g., City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 426 U.S. 668, 676-77
(1976). But see L. TRIBE, supra note 9, at 493-95.
22. See Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 202 (1944).
23. See, e.g., Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 563-64 (1976); Vaca
v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182 (1967).
24. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 457-58 (1966) ("incommunicado inter-
rogation" is "destructive of human dignity" and conflicts with privilege against self-
incrimination); Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957) ("underlying idea" behind
guarantee against double jeopardy "is that the State . . . should not be allowed to make
repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him
to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state
of anxiety and insecurity").
25. Payton v. New York, 48 U.S.L.W. 4375, 4380, 4383 (U.S. April 15, 1980) (No. 78-5420)
(absent exigent circumstances, Fourth Amendment requires warrant to arrest person in
home even with probable cause); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (Fourth
Amendment implies "right to privacy"); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)
(Fourth Amendment applies to all government invasions of "the sanctity of a man's home
and the privacies of life"). That privacy alone cannot account for the Fourth Amend-
ment, see ELY, supra note 4, at 96, 172, obviously does not show that procedural con-
cerns alone-such as limiting official discretion--can suffice to explain it. But see id. at 97.
1069
The Yale Law Journal
provisions of the Constitution, such as the rights to counsel, con-
frontation, bail, and jury trial, echo similar themes; they function,
often at some cost to the efficiency and accuracy of fact-finding, -2I to
prevent the government from treating individuals in the criminal pro-
cess as though they were objects.
27
Even outside the criminal context, elaborating rights of adjudicative
process requires recourse to a substantive theory. Procedural due pro-
cess rights are not simply means of protecting whatever "entitlements"
happen to be conferred by legislation or administrative regulation.
Otherwise, the drafters of an entitlement could frame it in the pro-
cedural terms of their choice, and the constitutional guarantee would
be reduced to a right to receive whatever process the drafters had de-
fined as due.28 But that view has been repeatedly rejected by the
Supreme Court, which has never fully embraced a purely positivist
theory of procedural due process. 29 The only alternative theories, how-
ever, are ones that posit a right to individual dignity, or some similarly
substantive norm, as the base on which conceptions of procedural fair-
ness are constructed.30
If process is constitutionally valued, therefore, it must be valued not
only as a means to some independent end, but for its intrinsic char-
acteristics: being heard is part of what it means to be a person.3 1 Pro-
26. See generally Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 1,
6-23 (1964) (tension in criminal process between crime control model, seeking efficient, ex-
peditious and reliable screening and disposition of persons suspected of crimes, and due
process model, seeking maintenance of dignity and autonomy of individual).
27. See generally C. FRIED, AN ANATOMY OF VALUEs 125-32 (1970) (criminal procedure
has "expressive aspects" and implicitly evidences societal ends).
28. One difficulty with a positivist theory of entitlements is that, if the Constitution
requires government to deliver only what it promises, government is likely to respond
by promising little. The present confusion in the law of procedural due process is strik-
ingly illustrated by the Supreme Court's failure to require even the government to honor
its procedural commitments. See, e.g., United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741 (1979)
(evidence obtained by method contrary to agency regulations not excluded under exclu-
sionary rule).
29. See, e.g., Vitek v. Jones, 100 S. Ct. 1254, 1261-62 (1980); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S.
247, 266 (1978); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
30. See, e.g., Michelman, Formal and Associational Aims in Procedural Due Process,
in DUE PROCESS: Nomos XVIII 126, 127 (J. Pennock 9- J. Chapman eds. 1977) (due process
vindicates substantive values of "participation" and "revelation"); Saphire, Specifying Due
Process Values: Toward a More Responsive Approach to Procedural Protection, 127 U.
PA. L. REv. 111, 117-25 (1978) (due process standard should measure whether conduct in
question comports with basic notions of fairness and dignity). Values like accuracy do not
by themselves justify a constitutional right to procedural due process. "Accuracy" is in-
evitably an instrumental concept. To give it content, to decide which procedures a con-
cern for accuracy requires, we must look to the entitlement in question. The legislature,
in drafting the statute conferring the entitlement, may deliberately define it in ambiguous
terms. If the entitlement is not precisely defined, a concern for accuracy presumably
would not result in elaborate procedure. Thus an instrumentalist approach leaves an
opening for positivism.
31. What process is due depends upon what is at stake in a given case. The interest at
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cess itself, therefore, becomes substantive. There is a curious irony
here. One who holds that constitutional law should aim chiefly to
perfect process is apparently unable to treat process as itself valuable.
For, to see why process would itself be valuable-intrinsically so-is to
see why the Constitution is inevitably substantive. Instead, the process-
perfecter must treat process as ultimately instrumental, as but a means
to other ends, and thus must regard as secondary what he would at the
same time celebrate as primary.
32
The process theorist is similarly confounded by questions about the
right to vote-the quintessential procedural right in the realm of
politics. Voting-rights issues commonly take one of two forms. One set
of issues concerns who votes. Is the electorate to include racial minori-
ties, women, District of Columbia residents, eighteen-year-olds? 33 Is it
to include only property owners, only property owners and parents,
only residents, only citizens? 34 What of the disenfranchisement of
children?35 Who votes, it turns out, is a profoundly substantive ques-
tion.3 6 For who participates-who counts-in the electoral process is a
question that must precede any inquiry into the fairness of the process
itself. The issue goes not to fairness procedurally, but to our sense of
who constitutes a political community, and of which relations in
society must be horizontal rather than vertical, fraternal rather than
hierarchical. And if any question is plainly substantive, that question is
fundamentally so.37
The second set of issues concerns how voting power is to be allocated
among those who are included within an electoral constituency. Some-
times, in this context, the Supreme Court looks to whether the election
stake is pertinent to what procedures, in a given circumstance, are consistent with in-
dividual dignity. See, e.g., Cafeteria 8: Restaurant Workers Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S.
886, 895 (1961) (consideration of what procedures due process may require under any
given set of circumstances must begin with determination of private interest affected);
Note, Specifying the Procedures Required by Due Process: Toward Limits on the Use of
Interest Balancing, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1510, 1528-30 (1975) (process due depends on interest
at stake).
32. See ELY, supra note 4, at 95-96.
33. See U.S. CONST. amends. XV, XIX, XXIII, XXVI.
34. See City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970) (franchise cannot be limited
to property owners); Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969)
(franchise in school board election cannot be limited to property owners and parents);
Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60 (1978) (nonresidents can be denied vote
even in jurisdiction that taxes and regulates them); Rosberg, Aliens and Equal Protection:
Why Not the Right to Vote?, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1092 (1977).
35. See Developments in the Law-The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARV. L
REv. 1156, 1201-02, 1221-42, 1350-83 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Developments].
36. Conventionally, it is treated as if it were a matter of procedure. See, e.g., ELY,
supra note 4, at 98-99.
37. Consider the question whether fetuses are persons with rights, a question raised
by the right-to-life critique of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See L. TRIBE, supra note
9, at 926-29.
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is one that chooses representatives or one that resolves a one-shot issue,38
or whether voters are voting as individuals or as, say, property
owners.39 But generally, the Court has enforced the famous rule an-
nounced in the reapportionment cases: one person, one vote.40 The
obvious substantive underpinnings of this rule-its role as an expression
of the equal respect in which we as a society aspire to hold each in-
dividual 4 -all of this the theorists of perfecting process must ignore.
They can defend the rule only hesitantly, claiming, for example, that
it is merely a matter of administrative convenience.42 Again we observe
the irony already revealed in the adjudicative process cases: because
embracing process for its own sake means embracing process as sub-
stance-as an expression of the value in which we would hold in-
dividuals-theorists who would defend constitutional law as ultimately
reducible to the quest for perfection of process cannot themselves treat
process as primary.43 Again the puzzle deepens: as the next section will
show, theorists of perfecting process are not only undercut by their
inability affirmatively to advocate process as such, but their negative
critique of obstructed process is stunted as well.
III. The Quandary of Whom to Protect
For those who would fill the gaps left by the Constitution's ambigui-
ties and silences with representation-reinforcing principles, perhaps the
core "process value" is the value of protecting certain minorities from
perennial defeat in the political arena. The theme was anticipated by
John Marshall; 44 it assumed a central role for Harlan Fiske Stone;4
38. See Town of Lockport v. Citizens for Community Action at the Local Level, Inc.,
430 U.S. 259 (1977) (sustaining constitutionality of electoral procedures requiring con-
current majorities for restructuring constituent political units).
39. See Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719
(1973) (sustaining rule tantamount to "one acre, one vote" in composition of special water
districts).
40. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 567-68 (1964).
41. See R. DWORKIN, TAKING RicIrs SERIOUSLY 273 (1977).
42. See, e.g., ELY, supra note 4, at 124.
43. Nor can such theorists rest with a view that accepts a purely instrumental role for
procedural norms and defends the constitutional plan as an indirect scheme for imple-
menting substantive values that are not authoritatively established by the Constitution
itself. For if the realization of such substantive values is the Constitution's aim, then
their elaboration is appropriately the task of all who would interpret the Constitution.
44. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 435-36 (1819) (state has no
power to tax federal instrumentality because it would thereby act on national popula-
tion, not represented in its legislature).
45. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 nA (1938) (strict judicial
review for statutes that are directed against "discrete and insular minorities"); South
Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 184 n.2 (1938) (commerce
clause may prohibit legislation burdening political outsiders).
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it signally motivated Earl Warren; 46 and it has been elaborated by
numerous scholars 47 most powerfully in the work of John Ely.48 The
idea seems as simple as it sounds reasonable: governmental action that
burdens groups effectively excluded from the political process is con-
stitutionally suspect. In its most sophisticated form, the resulting ju-
dicial scrutiny is seen as a way of invalidating governmental classifica-
tions and distributions that turn out to have been motivated either by
prejudiced hostility or by self-serving stereotypes. 4
9
It all sounds pretty good-until we ask how we are supposed to
distinguish such "prejudice" from principled, if "wrong," disapproval.
Which groups are to count as "discrete and insular minorities"? Which
are instead to be deemed appropriate losers in the ongoing struggle
for political acceptance and ascendancy?
To begin with, of course, the theory must clearly distinguish itself
from its reductio ad absurdum: "whichever group happens to lose the
political struggle or fails to command the attention of the legislature
is-by that fact alone-a discrete and insular minority."' ° How
about focusing on immutability, discreteness, insularity? For the pro-
cess theorist, all such features might seem helpful in suggesting why a
legislature would regard some groups as "different" and thus fall prey
to cruel or self-servingly careless stereotyping. Or such features may
signal why other groups would fail to interact with a group considered
"different," or to engage in the usual protective logrolling.
But features like immutability are neither sufficient ' nor necessary. 5"
46. See Ely, The Chief, 88 HARv. L. REv. 11, 12 (1974) (Warren sought to ensure that
machinery of democratic process does not become self-serving organ of privileged class).
47. See, e.g., L. LUSKY, supra note 3, at 11-12; L. TRIBE, supra note 9, passim.
48. See ELY, supra note 4, at 135-79.
49. See id. at 153-70.
50. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV.
L. RLv. 1, 8 (1979); see Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 657 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dis-
senting) (no "extraordinary ingenuity" needed for lawyers to "find 'insular and discrete'
minorities at every turn in the road").
51. Immutability by itself is plainly not sufficient. Intelligence, height, and strength
are all immutable for a particular individual, but legislation that distinguishes on the
basis of these criteria is not generally thought to be constitutionally suspect. Discreteness
and insularity are also insufficient: chiropractors may be a discrete and insular minority,
but legislation that singles them out would not be subject to strict scrutiny on that basis
alone. Even all three factors in combination may not be sufficient. Old age is an im-
mutable characteristic, and the elderly may well be a discrete and insular minority. How-
ever, age is not per se a suspect criterion of classification. See Massachusetts Bd. of Re-
tirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (per curiam). For background discussion, see L.
TRIBE, supra note 9, at 1077-82.
52. Alienage is properly treated as a classification at least partially suspect, despite its
mutable character. See, e.g., Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977) (denying state scholar-
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For in looking at social attitudes toward groups, one cannot simply
play Linnaeus and engage in taxonomy. One cannot speak of "groups"
as though society were objectively subdivided along lines that are just
there to be discerned.5 3 Instead, people draw lines, attribute differences,
as a way of ordering social existence-of deciding who may occupy what
place, play what role, engage in what activity. Thus, in order to justify
the role of chattel that blacks initially played in our society, we may
have differentiated that role by describing it in terms of the most
obvious distinguishing feature of the people who played it, thus equat-
ing race and role.54 This equation, and thus the "group," survived the
Civil War and the Thirteenth Amendment. It did so not simply by
reason of confusion or inertia, but because the role that society allowed
blacks remained partly unchanged; thus the need to justify the role by
differentiating it, by seeing not the role but the group-"inferior"
blacks capable of nothing better anyway-persisted.55
The temptation to think of groups as simply given is exacerbated by
the complex interaction between social attitudes and those identified
as group members. Individuals who find themselves so identified may
indeed see themselves as group members; because they approve of the
options that society leaves them and want to protect those options, they
identify the options with themselves, the differentiated "group."' 0 Al-
ternatively, assertion of group status may be a form of internal exile, a
way of repudiating the limited possibilities for action that the larger
social structure would allow, a choice of "exit" rather than "voice.
357
ship aid to resident aliens who choose to remain noncitizens violates equal protection).
And even if race or gender became readily mutable by biomedical means, I would sup-
pose that laws burdening those who choose to remain black or female would properly
remain constitutionally suspect.
53. This point is neatly illustrated by a passage quoted by Foucault, in which Borges
cites a Chinese encyclopedia's assertion that "animals are divided into: (a) belonging to
the Emperor, (b) embalmed, (c) tame, (d) sucking pigs, (e) sirens, (f) fabulous, (g) stray
dogs, (h) included in the present classification, (i) frenzied, (j) innumerable, (k) drawn
with a very fine camelhair brush, (1) et cetera, (m) just having broken the water pitcher,
(n) that from a long way off look like flies." M. FOUCAULT, THE ORDER OF THINGS XV
(1970).
54. See W. JORDAN, WHITE OVER BLACK (1968).
55. See C. V. WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW (2d ed. 1966).
56. Individuals who disapprove of the options that society presents them may never-
theless accept their treatment as a differentiated group, and accept as natural or inevitable
their inferior status. Even individuals with options more favorable than those of most
group members may accept the social characterization of the group in order to differ-
entiate themselves from the group. See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 503 (1977)
(Marshall, J., concurring); cf. G. WEINBERG, SOCIETY AND THE HEALTHY HOMOSEXUAL 74-82
(1972) (homosexual self-loathing, contempt, and prejudice parallel societal attitudes).
57. Thus, some blacks may differentiate themselves as a way of rejecting, or of ex-
pressing a critical judgment about, the options with which society at large leaves them.
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This way of thinking about groups, I believe, captures not only
much of the dynamics of race, but also much of the social significance
of religion, alienage, gender, sexual preference, legitimacy, wealth-
traits we as a society commonly use in separating out groupsYs Views
about the "differentness" of groups generally, therefore, may reflect an
interacting set of judgments about activities or options or roles, ex-
pressed sometimes harmoniously and sometimes dialectically by both
"we" and "they."' 0 If so, the conclusion that a legislative classification
reveals prejudicial stereotypes must, at bottom, spring from a disagree-
ment with the judgments that lie behind the stereotype: judgments
about the propriety of the options left to individuals or the burdens
imposed on them.
Consider several illustrations. Burglars are subject to widespread
hostility: indeed, the activity that defines the group is everywhere
legislatively prohibited. Are burglars therefore a "suspect class"? Of
course not. Suspect status is unthinkable-but only because of the
substantive value we attach to personal security, and the importance
for us of the system of private property and its rules of transfer, which
the burglary prohibition preserves. 60 If we speak of burglars as a class,
we do so as a way of giving form to our view that burglary is a "dif-
ferent" activity, different not so much because burglars visibly define
a group as because we disapprove of the activity, deny it any claim to
protection as a right.
Homosexuals, too, are subject to widespread hostility; legislation
penalizing homosexuals and homosexual practices is common.0 1 Homo-
sexuals often do not identify themselves by sexual preference when
acting politically, and generally do not "come out of the closet" to
refute the traditional stereotypes.0 2 But even if they did, legislation
might be unaltered. Coming out of the closet could dispel ignorance,
but it may not alter belief. Legislators may see homosexuals as "dif-
Cf. A. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY 108-12 (1970) (American black power move-
ment advocates collective program for blacks as group and rejects traditional pattern of
upward social mobility for individual, selected blacks).
58. See Fiss, supra note 3, at 124-33; cf. G. MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA 27-30 (1944).
59. See Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. CHI. L.
REv. 723, 732 (1974).
60. See ELY, supra note 4, at 154.
61. See Rivera, Our Straight-Laced Judges: The Legal Position of Homosexual Persons
in the United States, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 799 (1979).
62. See ELY, supra note 4, at 163 ("serious social costs" of encountering prejudice upon
admission); C. REICH, THE SORCERER OF BOLINAS REEF 71-73 (1976) (fear of societal oppro-
brium caused repression of homosexuality). But see L. HUMPHREYS, OUT OF THE CLOSETS
(1972) (chronicling recent organizational activism, political action, and violence by homo-
sexuals in response to oppression).
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ferent" not out of ignorance, but on principle-on the basis of a
morality that treats certain sexual practices as repugnant to a particular
view of humanity, and thus regards people who engage in those prac-
tices as "other." 63 Such legislation can be rejected only on the basis of
a principle that is equally substantive: a view of what it means to be a
person, and to have a sexual identity. 4 Process and prejudice thus
seem profoundly beside the point. Any constitutional distinction be-
tween laws burdening homosexuals and laws burdening exhibitionists,
between laws burdening Catholics and laws burdening pickpockets,
must depend on a substantive theory of which groups are exercising
fundamental rights and which are not.6,
Indeed, even laws putting blacks and women "in their place"-
banning racial intermarriage, say, or excluding women from combat-
are likely to reflect neither simple hostility nor self-serving blindness
but a substantive vision of proper conduct-a vision that no amount of
attention to flaws in the political process could condemn or correct.
Accordingly, the idea of blacks or women as properly segregated beings
can be rejected only by finding a constitutional basis for concluding
that, in our society, such hierarchical visions are substantively out of
bounds, at least as a justification for government action.06 And such a
finding would in turn entail a theory of unenumerated substantive
rights, rights at best suggested by constitutional text and history, rights
whose necessarily controversial elaboration the process theorists seek
to eschew.
67
63. See, e.g., Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney for City of Richmond, 403 F. Supp.
1199, 1202 (E.D. Va. 1975), aff'd mem., 425 U.S. 901 (1976) ("ancestry" of state statute
prohibiting sodomy goes back to Judaic and Christian law); Barrett, Legal Homophobia
and the Christian Church, 30 HASTINcs L.J. 1019 (1979) (arguing that Christian morality
is responsible for legal homophobia).
64. See Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 633-35 (1980).
65. See Developments, supra note 35, at 1176 n.119.
66. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210 n.23 (1976) (dictum) (disapproving earlier
decision that upheld occupational exclusions of women); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967) (invalidating ban on racial intermarriage). If, as some suggest, see, e.g., ELY, supra
note 4, at 256 n.92, a governmental decision to impose a burden could be defended simply
by showing that the decision reflects "a bona fide feeling that [the burdened choice] is
immoral," id., then even racial segregation would be sustainable.
67. Even assuming that laws burdening groups such as women are founded on no
moral convictions, a process-based analysis is still fatally inadequate. Although legislation
discriminating against women does not, at least superficially, reflect hostility toward
women, and despite the fact that women are not a minority, there is nonetheless reason,
a process theorist might argue, for strict judicial scrutiny of such legislation. Male
legislators no doubt frequently regard women as "they" rather than "we." See ELY,
supra note 4, at 164. In process terms, however, this is a weak case. Arguably, all that
keeps women from full participation is the fact that many women (as well as men)
accept a view of society in which women are subject to men or are otherwise inappro-
priate participants in public life. But that view of society is increasingly controversial. To
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The crux of any determination that a law unjustly discriminates
against a group-blacks, or women, or even menS-is not that the law
emerges from a flawed process, or that the burden it imposes affects an
independently fundamental right, 09 but that the law is part of a pattern
that denies those subject to it a meaningful opportunity to realize their
humanity. Necessarily, such an approach must look beyond process to
identify and proclaim fundamental substantive rights. Whatever dif-
ficulties this may entail, it seems plain that important aspects of con-
stitutional law, including the determination of which groups deserve
special protection, can be given significant content in no other way.
Thus it is puzzling indeed that process-based approaches-designed to
deny the need for, and legitimacy of, any such substantive theory-
should nonetheless continue to find such articulate proponents and
persist in attracting such perceptive adherents.
IV. The Closed Circle of Political Openness
If protecting minorities requires a theory of substantive rights, might
another value, that of "political openness"-of clearing the channels
for change through speech and voting-be salvaged as a unifying theme
for the process-minded?70 First Amendment theorists such as Alexander
Meiklejohn have pursued this general line, with varying degrees of
success. 71 But there are at least three fundamental difficulties with any
effort to reduce substantive rights to mere mechanisms for channel-
clearing. The first problem is the inherently incomplete nature of
channel-clearing as an aim. Why should politics be open to equal
conclude today that women are an "excluded" group is simply to challenge the support
of many women and men for contemporary legislation. Thus only sexist laws enacted long
enough ago may be struck down as mere expressions of prejudicial stereotypes. See id. at
166-67.
Disputes over the place of women, however, are hardly a recent development. See E.
PAGELs, THE GNOSTIC GOSPELS 59-63 (1979) (tracing Gnostic treatment of women as equals);
A. KELLY, ELEANOR OF AqUITAINE AND THE FouR KINGS 163-64 (1950) (women of late 12th-
century Poitevin court sat in judgment upon points of courtly love). The fact of con-
temporary dispute is thus not necessarily a sign of progress. But if the idea of equal rights
for women is a perpetually contested concept, then the constitutionality of legislation
that treats men and women differently cannot turn, as process theorists might argue, on
whether such legislation preceded or followed dispute about the status of women.
68. See, e.g., Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (state statutory scheme cannot exempt
women from alimony obligations imposed on men).
69. Neither drinking age, see Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), nor age of expiration
of parental support obligations, see Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975), involve inde-
pendently fundamental rights-but in both areas the Supreme Court has invalidated
gender-based lines that lock the sexes into their traditional roles.
70. See ELY, supra note 4, at 105-34.
71. See A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 27 (1948).
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participation by all? Doesn't that norm itself presuppose some sub-
stantive vision of human rights? Why wouldn't a vision rich enough
to support a reasonably complete theory of political openness also
suffice to generate a theory of which substantive claims individuals
may make against the majority?
The second problem is the absence of any plausible stopping point
for channel-clearing theories. If the system must be open to change
through peaceful persuasion, how do we distinguish between example
and advocacy or between demonstration and assertion as forms of
persuasion? If we do not draw some such distinction, life-style choices
that seek to convince by demonstration-communal living arrange-
ments or homosexual marriage, for example-are entitled to constitu-
tionally protected status. Surely that is not what process theorists have
in mind! Efforts to draw the necessary distinctions, however, are in-
evitably unsatisfactory. To accord special protection to advocacy alone
is to censor those messages that can be conveyed only by example.
Moreover, dichotomies such as speech and conduct, expression and
action, or persuasion and instruction, do not in truth separate.72
If the acts of individuals may be demonstrations, and hence forms of
persuasion, may not the same be said of the acts of government?73 The
actions of government define expectations, confer legitimacy, establish
a status quo, and thus necessarily shape the nature and distribution of
interests and attitudes in society itself. The state shapes society almost
as much as society shapes the state: this is the third problem that any
channel-clearing theory must confront-but cannot surmount without
losing its "procedural" status.
Government subsidies to "major" political parties, for example, or
the failure of state governments to provide funds to compensate school
districts lacking "rich" property tax bases, are government actions that
affirm some aspects of the status quo as desirable, and others as in-
evitable. Such government actions are at present constitutional,'74 as are
governmental decisions that inculcate the young with the standard
public virtues and defeat the self-defining, value-forming, and power-
amassing efforts of all but the more standard social groupings.75 Unable
72. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, supra note 9, at 598-601; ELY, supra note 4, at 113 n.*.
73. See Yudof, When Governments Speak: Toward A Theory of Government Expression
and the First Amendment, 57 TEx. L. REV. 863 (1979).
74. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); San Antonio Independent School Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). But see Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96
Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971) (interpreting state constitution as creating a cause of action for
violation of equal protection in suit to invalidate property tax funding of public schools).
75. Compare, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (protecting ex-
tended families) with Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (households of
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to support a challenge to such exercises of power, a truly procedural
channel-clearing theory seems doomed to irrelevance, for without such
challenge government may well be able to shape the "will" of thegoverned in the image of those who govern,76 reducing consent and
representation to all but empty ideals.
This should not seem too surprising: that domination can appear in
the guise of democracy is hardly a novel observation in the late
twentieth century. The puzzle is that the failure of process-based
theories even to speak to this danger should be so readily and per-
sistently excused or overlooked.
V. A Broader Role for Constitutional Theory
One final and closely related puzzle-a puzzle that may follow from
the very aspiration of process-based theories to purge constitutional
discourse of inevitably controversial claims about substantive rights
and values-is the willingness of so many to embrace process-based
theories in the face of their virtually total incapacity to inform the
content of public discussion, debate, and decision. One can perhaps
understand the appeal to judges of a theory purporting to instruct them
that they are to construe the Constitution so as to reinforce representa-
tion, that is, fill in the blanks so as to perfect democracy. But what can
be the appeal of such a theory to an elected representative-especially
one who regards the Constitution as addressed to all who govern,77 and
who accordingly wonders whether some of the "interests" of his con-
stituents ought, as a constitutional matter, to be resisted rather than
represented?78 And what can be the appeal of such a theory to a citizen
who regards the Constitution as addressed to the people at large, and
who, accordingly, asks which of his preferences-for exploiting the poor,
perhaps, or for denigrating ethnic minorities-the citizen ought to
suppress or even change?
unrelated individuals not protected); compare NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963)
(group legal services protected) with Garcia v. Texas State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 384
F. Supp. 434 (W.D. Tex. 1974), aff'd nenz., 421 U.S. 995 (1975) (group health plans not).
76. Ely notes this phenomenon in connection with his discussion of the idea of prog-
ress as an organizing basis for constitutional law: "[Tloday's judicial decision (no matter
what its source of judgment) will inevitably have an important influence on the values of
tomorrow's majority." ELY, supra note 4, at 70. Cf. id. at 165 (societal stereotypes accepted
by the stereotyped). He does not, however, generalize this insight to government action
generally.
77. See Linde, "Clear and Present Danger" Reexamined: Dissonance in the Branden-
burg Concerto, 22 STAN. L. Rav. 1163 (1970); Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB.
L. REv. 197 (1976).
78. See H. PrrsrN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION (1967).
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Perhaps the impoverished relevance of the Constitution for everyone
except judges under a process-based theory is to be offset in some way
by the theory's supposed ability to improve constitutional argument,
analysis, and adjudication in the judicial branch. But are we really to
believe that the way judges decide cases will be powerfully and bene-
ficially affected by theories linking the judiciary's constitutional role
to the supposed failures of political process? Might not the care and
humility that we are entitled to expect of judges be undermined if
judges were indeed persuaded that much judicial activism is simply
a corollary of democracy?
Most process-based theorists and their followers evidently have seen
little point in analyzing what the general acceptance'of their views
would be likely to do to the actual course of constitutional argument
and decision.79 The views they espouse apparently strike chords so
responsive, accord with beliefs so deep, that inquiry into probable
effects-like close attention to counter-examples and logical gaps-
seems beside the point. But if this is so, then we are left with a final
puzzle, one to be explored in a later essay: what does it say about
our situation, and about the prospect for constitutional theory, that
views so deeply problematic continue to exert so powerful a grip upon
our thought?
79. But see ELY, supra note 4, at 102 n.* (concern over effect of theory on protection
of civil liberties).
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